Abstract-In two-tier wireless sensor networks, resource-rich storage nodes at the upper tier collect sensing data from resourcepoor sensor nodes at the low tier, and then answer queries from the user. Sensor nodes perform sensing task and submit sensing data in one time-slot to the nearest storage node while storage nodes answer and process the query from the network owner. However the storage nodes confront serious security concerns. Storage nodes may be compromised and leak the sensitive data as well as returning fake query result. Therefore, it is important to protect the privacy and verify the query results. In this paper, we define and solve the practical and challenging problem of privacypreserving and verifiable top-k query processing performed on the time-slot sensing data set in two-tier sensor network, and establish a set of privacy and correctness requirements for such a secure top-k query scheme to become a reality. We propose the basic PriSecTopk scheme by using order-preserving encryption, and then improve it step by step to achieve various privacy requirements as well as the correctness requirements in three levels of threat models. Theoretical analysis and experiment on the real-world data set successfully validate the efficacy and efficiency of the proposed schemes.
I. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks [1] become prevalent for pervasive computing and widely deployed for various applications such as intrusion detection, earthquake prediction and environment sensing, etc.. It usually consists of resource limited nodes in terms of storage capacity and computing capacity. Various inherent limitations of it appear especially resource constraints which limit the storage capacity of sensing data and the computing capacity of processing query. These limitations deserve special attention especially in the remote and extreme environment where a high-speed and always-on connection is infeasible [2] [3] . Extensive research has been conducted to address these limitations by developing a two-tier wireless sensor network where the storage node [4] is introduced. Several commercial storage nodes have appeared, such as StarGate [5] .
A two-tier wireless sensor network consists of large amount of resource-limited sensor nodes at the lower-tier which sense the environment information and plenty of resourcerich relatively storage nodes at the upper-tier which gather data from the nearby sensor nodes and answer queries from the user. While storage nodes bring several benefits such as prolonging network lifetime, saving the memory of sensor nodes and processing queries efficiently, the storage node faces serious security concerns in hostile environment. First, when the storage node is compromised, the sensing data from the sensor nodes, the history of query requests and the corresponding query results are exposed. Second, it may cause heavy loss when the compromised sensor nodes return fake, forged or incomplete data for a query especially in military and commercial application. Therefore, developing a privacypreserving and result-verifiable mechanism is of paramount importance such that the authenticity and completeness of the query results can be verified as well as the privacy of the sensitive data is protected.
Recently various secure query schemes have been proposed in two-tier sensor network aiming at the range query [6] , [7] , [8] and top-k query [9] . However they didn't address the privacy problem of top-k query in two-tier wireless sensor network. In addition, all the secure query schemes are performed on the data set which consists of sensing data sampled from several successive time slots by all sensor nodes, referred to as a time interval. Sensor nodes submit to the nearest storage node all the data sensing during the time interval that the storage nodes process query in the time interval data set. As shown in the analysis, it is a general case in many real-world application where the query is performed on the data set in which each data items are from the sensor nodes sampling and submitting at one single time slot, referred to as a time slot data set such as Intel Lab [10] . The schemes they proposed are inefficient and introduce large amount of communication consumption when performed on the time slot data set.
In this paper, for the first time, we propose a privacypreserving and query-verifiable top-k query mechanism on the time slot data set in two-tier wireless sensor network while achieving energy efficiency. Among various top-k query semantics, we choose the single score function model that each data can be scored by the scoring function and ranked based on its score. In consideration of three levels of threat models, we propose the basic PriSecTopk scheme by using orderpreserving encryption, and then improve it step by step to achieve various privacy requirements as well as the correctness requirements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present related work. Section III introduces the system, and threat models, and our design goals. In Section IV we describe the PriSecTopk framework and security requirements. The following Section V presents the details and performance analysis of the three PriSecTopk schemes corresponding to three threat models. Section VI presents the performance evaluation and the experiments of our schemes. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section VII.
II. Related Work

A. Secure Query in Two-tier Sensor Networks
Sheng et al. proposed a scheme [6] to protect the privacy and integrity of range query in two-tier sensor network which utilized the idea of bucket partition to preserve privacy. However, the inherited limitation of bucket partition technique allows compromised storage nodes to achieve the estimation on the actual value of data items and the query request. Extending the work from one-dimensional data to multidimensional data, Shi et al. [7] optimized the scheme to reduce the communication consumption between the sensor nodes and the storage node. Nevertheless, both of the schemes introduce great energy consumption and storage consumption when the data dimension increases. To solve this problem, SafeQ was proposed [8] in consideration of neighborhood chains that allows a sink to verify the correctness of data items. With regards to the top-k query, Zhang et al. proposed VFTop-k scheme [9] to verify the correctness of the query result through adding the order-related verification information in the sensing data.
B. Order-preserving Symmetric Encryption
The order-preserving symmetric encryption scheme (OPE) is a deterministic encryption scheme where the numerical ordering of the plaintexts gets preserved by the encryption function. OPE was proposed in the database community by Agrawal et al. [11] to support efficient range queries on encrypted data. Then Boldyreva et al. [12] proposed the first formal cryptographic treatment of OPE which was an efficient blockcipher-based scheme provably meeting their security definition. Boldyreva et al. proved that the orderpreserving function g(x) for a given point x ∈ {1, . . . , M} has a NHG distribution over a random choice of g. However, this encryption scheme leaks approximate value of any plaintext and approximate distance between any two plaintexts, each to an accuracy of about square root of the domain size. In the revised order-preserving symmetric encryption proposed by Boldyreva et al. [13] , a more efficient and stronger range queries appeared which however was not order-preserving.
III. Problem Formulation
A. System Model
We consider a two-tier sensor network involving the sensor nodes at the lower tier and the storage node at the upper tier. The sensor nodes which collect environment information as sensing data has a limited storage resource and computing power while the storage nodes are equipped with much stronger storage capacity and computing power than sensor nodes. Sensor nodes periodically send their collected data to the nearest storage nodes. The storage nodes serve as an intermediate tier between the user and the sensors for storing data and processing queries.
For the above network architecture, without loss of generality, we assume that the lower-tier sensor network with N static sensors randomly distributed in a large-scale area.
Each sensor has a unique sensor ID and similar storage capacity and computing power. Meanwhile, each storage node is powerful and resourceful enough to store sensing data and process query. All sensor nodes and storage nodes are loosely synchronized through the secure synchronized scheme [14] .
B. Threat Model
At first, the storage node is considered as "honest-butcurious" in our model. Specifically, storage node acts in an "honest" fashion and correctly follows the designated protocol specification. However, it is "curious" to infer and analyze data in its storage and query messages received during the protocol so as to learn additional information. In particular, the storage nodes analyze the sensing data from the lower-tier sensor nodes to gain the environment information or mine the query request from the users to know the query preference. Then, we extend the threat model into a more general one where the compromised storage node do not follow the designated protocol but return fake and/or incomplete data in response to top-k queries from the user. Based on the intensity of the attack, we consider three levels of the threat models as follows.
• Plaintext attack model -In this model, storage nodes intend to gain the plaintext of the sensing data and the query request. 
C. Design Goals
To enable privacy-preserving and result-verifiable top-k query performed on the time slot sensing data under the aforementioned model, our scheme should achieve security and performance guarantees as follows.
Privacy: To prevent the storage node from learning additional information over the sensing data and query request, and to meet the data privacy, query privacy and result privacy.
Authenticity/Completeness: All data in query results are indeed generated by the lower-tier sensor nodes and the query result indeed contain the top k sensing data items as the top-k query requests.
Efficiency: Above goals on privacy and authenticity/completeness should be achieved with low communication and computation overheads.
IV. Framework and Security requirement for PriSecTopk
In this section, we define the framework of top-k query over encrypted sensing data and establish various strict security requirements for such a two-tier wireless sensor network.
A. PriSecTopk Framework
• Initialization() Besides collecting sensing data, the sensor node generates the secret key used in the scheme and calculates the scores for sensing data.
• MsgEnc() Performed on the time slot data set, sensor node encrypts the sensing score and the time stamp by the symmetric key and then outsources them to storage node along with Message Authentication Codes.
• IntitQuery() Before sending the query request, the user encrypts the query request.
• Query() When the storage node receives a query request, it performs the top-k query on the set of encrypted sensing scores and then returns the top-k encrypted sensing records as query result.
• MsgDec() The user generates the secret key to decrypt the sensing records and then achieves the top-k sensing scores.
B. Security Requirement for PriSecTopk 1) Privacy:
We explore and establish a set of strict privacy requirements specifically for the PriSecTopk Framework.
As for the data privacy on the time-slot data set, the sensor nodes should utilize a stateless encryption scheme to encrypt the data before outsourcing. In this scheme he encryption algorithm is processed on the single plaintexts, and prevent the storage nodes from prying into outsourced data. With respect to the query privacy, the users prefer to keep their query request from being exposed to the third party i.e., the time stamp and the k value. Traditional symmetric key cryptography should be resorted to guarantee the query efficiency of the scheme on the encrypted data set. The query results returned by the storage nodes contain much information such as the order-relation and the distance-relation in topk query, therefore we consider the result privacy to prevent from the background attack. Within the top-k query, the orderrelation exposes the value order of the sensing scores in the top-k query result while the distance-relation exposes the value distance of the sensing scores in the top-k query result.
2) Authenticity/Completeness: Extending the attack model from the "honest-but-curious" to a more general one, the storage nodes may be compromised in hostile environments and then instructed to return fake and/or incomplete data in response to the top-k query. Therefore, the user should verify the authenticity and completeness of the query results which forces the compromised storage nodes to return both authentic and complete top-k query results to avoid being caught. In particular, authenticity guarantees the sensing records indeed generated by the sensor node not by the compromised storage nodes, and completeness means that the query results indeed contains the top k sensing data among all the candidates.
V. Privacy-preserving and Secure PriSecTopk Before giving our intact result, we start with a straightforward yet ideal scheme where the storage nodes follow the designate protocol to better illustrate the privacy problem in the two-tier wireless sensor network. Then, we assume a more general attack model that the compromised storage nodes do not follow the designate protocol but return the fake/incomplete query result in addition to learn additional information over the sensing data and query request.
A. PriSecTopk I: Basic Scheme
With respect to the plaintext attack model, PriSecTopk I enables the privacy of sensing data and query request by encrypting the data items with revised order-preserving and traditional symmetric encryption respectively. 1) PriSecTopk I: To provide a privacy guarantee against the attack on the plaintext of sensing data and query request as well as the efficiency requirement, we utilize revised order-preserving encryption scheme and traditional symmetric encryption to encrypt the sensing data and query request. The order-preserving symmetric encryption scheme (OPS E) is based on the observation that any order-preserving function g from {1, . . . , M} to {1, . . . , N} can be uniquely represented by a combination of M out of N order items. The whole scheme to achieve top-k query over encrypted data in two-tier wireless sensor network is as follows.
Before deployed, each sensor node u shares with the user a unique secret key k u which we call the node's individual key. Also the user and the sensor nodes have the same pseudo-random function f (), corresponding seed and collision resistant hash function π. The sensor initiates the scheme by generating random keys x, y from the pseudo-random function f (). After gaining the sensing data d u at the time-slot t, the sensor node u calculates the score s u for the sensing data.
Let E be a semantically secure symmetric encryption algorithm. Each sensor node u encrypts the score s u by orderpreserving symmetric encryption as shown in Algorithm 1 to gain the ciphertext of the score OPS E(s u ) and then encrypt node ID using key f x (t), compute the keyed-hash for time stamp t. Sensor node u sends the encrypted data along with Message Authentication Code to the closest storage node S .
To encrypt the query request Q q =< q, t > where q is the query code and t is the time stamp to query. With the pseudo-random function f () and the corresponding seed, user generates the secret key x to encrypt the query time stamp with the one-way hash function π and then sends the secret key f x (t) along with the ciphertext of the query time stamp to the storage node.
user → S : q, π x (t), f x (t) With the ciphertext of the query time stamp, storage node locates the matching list of the sensing data via π x (t), uses f x (t) to achieve the OPS E sensing scores and then sorts the OPS E sensing scores to fetch the top k sensing data records. Storage nodes send back the top-k encrypted sensing records i.e. E f x (t) OPS E(s u ),E f y (t) (id u ),π x (y),MAC(k u , m) to the user.
Upon receiving the query response from the storage node, the user first utilizes the pseudo-random function and the corresponding seed shared with sensor node to generate the secret key y and gain f y (t) to decrypt sensor node ID, then locates the key for the each sensor node with which it can verify the MACs returned along with every sensing data record. After decrypting the OPS E(s u ) by order-preserving decryption scheme, the user finally obtains the top-k sensing scores as the query result.
2) Analysis: We analyze the basic scheme from two aspects.
Privacy: As for query privacy, traditional symmetric key encryption techniques could be properly utilized by the user when issuing query request which are not within the scope of this paper. The data privacy is well protected not only by the symmetric key encryption but also the order-preserving encryption scheme to guarantee the top-k query. The essence of order-preserving encryption can be seen as a combination of the size of domain M out of the size of range N ordered items. An adversary can only break the encryption scheme by performing a brute force search over all the possible combination of M out of N. If the security level is chosen to be 80 bits, then it is suggested to choose M= N/2>80 so that the total number of combination will be greater than 2 80 . Therefore, the data privacy and query privacy are well protected in our basic scheme, while it is an unsolved privacy leakage problem of result privacy.
Efficiency: With the help of order-preserving encryption scheme, the storage node can process the top-k query as efficiently as for the unencrypted sensing scores. In the encryption and decryption process, the number of recursive calls is at most log N + 1 in the worst-case and at most 5 log M + 12 on average. As for memory addition, PriSecTopk I do not ask for additional memory except for the MACs.
B. PriSecTopk II
The basic scheme performs outstanding from the efficiency perspective and also provides privacy guarantee by using order-preserving encryption scheme, but it will incur orderrelation privacy leakage among the plaintexts once the storage node processes query on the order-preserving encrypted data. To guarantee the order-relation privacy, we improve the basic scheme with the idea of secret perturbation. Namely, when a sensor node has a sensing data to report, it does not report the original data, but the sum of the original data and the secret shared with the sink. In the scheme we proposed, the sensor nodes whose sensing score is perturbed are implicitly selected through random selection mechanism which guarantees the order-relation privacy.
1) PriSecTopk II: The order-relation and distance-relation privacy leakage stem from the simply usage of the sensing score as the plaintext of the order-preserving encryption scheme. Therefore, the idea of secret perturbation is utilized to protect the order-relation and distance-relation privacy. In this section, we propose an improved PriSecTopk scheme preserving result privacy as well as data and query privacy. Namely, we will show how to perturb the original sensing data while guarantee the correctness of the top-k query result in two-tier sensor networks.
In the Initialization step, except for the similar deploying process to the basic scheme, each sensor node u also shares a threshold P used in the random selection processing. After generating the random key x, y, z and calculating the score s u for the sensing data, the sensor nodes start the score perturbed processing. Each sensor node u computes h(z, k u , id u ) to implicitly decide whether to add the perturbation where h() is a random function. In particular, when satisfying the following formulas, sensor node u uses the perturbation version of the sensing score s u to encryption by order-preserving encryption scheme. Then, the encrypted sensing records are sent to the storage node with the same encryption method but using the perturbed version of the data instead of the original one.
i f h(z, k u , id u ) < P, then s u = s u + s max i f h(z, k u , id u ) ≥ P, then s u = s u where s max is the maximum number of the sensing score.
In the IntitQuery step, user obtains the number of sensor nodes that uses the perturbation version of the sensing score and the corresponding node ID by computing the following formula.
i f h(z, k u , id u ) < P, then r = r + 1, list = list ∪ id u Where r is the number of sensor nodes that uses the perturbation version of the sensing score and list is the perturbation ID list.
To encrypt the query request Q q =< q, t, k > where k = r + k. With the secret key x and the one-way hash function π, the user encrypts the query request and then sends it to the storage node.
user → S : q, π x (t), f x (t), k The storage node processes the query as the query request received from the user, i.e. fetching the k sensing data records whose OPS E sensing scores are k highest. Finally, in the MsgDec step, except for decrypting the OPS E(s u ) which is the reversing process of the encryption, the user should also reduce to achieve the original sensing score by subtracting s max from s u with the perturbation ID list. Then sort the k original sensing score to get the top-k query result.
2) Analysis: Similar to the basic scheme, we analyze the PriSecTopk II from two aspects.
Privacy: In PriSecTopk II, we introduce the secret perturbation to guarantee the result privacy. By implicitly choosing the sensor nodes that perturbs the original sensing score, the order and distance of the sensing score changes randomly. The compromised storage node can only gain the right order of query result with the probability 1 k ! . In addition, the query privacy is protected that the compromised storage nodes do not know the real number of query result to return.
Efficiency: Compared with the PriSecTopk I, the PriSecTopk II introduces additional communication cost for the redundancy query result and additional computing cost for the user to select the real query result. There exists tradeoff between privacy and efficiency. If the security level is chosen to be 80 bits, the number of sensor nodes is denoted as N, and N nodes have the perturbed sensing scores. Then the threshold P should meet the formula Pro( f ()
With the distribution of the random function, the threshold P can be determined.
C. PriSecTopk III
In this section, we consider a more general attack model instead of the "honest but curious" one which the compromised storage node may return fake and/or incomplete data in addition to what can be accessed in the background attack model. Now we further propose PriSecTopk III with stronger the security requirement of the top-k query in two-tier wireless sensor networks.
1) PriSecTopk III: To guarantee the authenticity and completeness of the top-k query in two-tier sensor networks, we require the storage node to return some computing commitment information during the query process. Through hypothesis testing method combined with computing commitment, the compromised storage nodes are forced to return both authentic and complete top-k query results to the network owner. Also these methods increase the detection rate and reduce the additional communication cost while enabling verifiable top-k queries.
Initialization() and MsgEnc() in PriSecTopk III are similar to those in PriSecTopk II. Considering the IntitQuery step, the user encrypts the query request Q q =< q, t, k , m > where m is the sample times used in query process, i.e. m = N−k s−k , where s is the number of chosen sensor node in query process. With the secret key x and the one-way hash function π, the user encrypts the query request and then sends it to the storage node.
user
In the query process, storage node is required to send back the computing commitment information key[ * ] = {id, data, sampledtimes} along with the query results. In particular, storage nodes generate the computing commitment information from the encrypted sensing scores query process as follows.
-select s sensing scores from {OPS E(s u )} and put the corresponding records into set C i.e. C ⊆ {OPS E(s u )},|C| = s. Sort the sensing score in set
-in every selection, select s sensing scores from R t and put the corresponding records into set C i.e. C ⊆ R t ,|C| = s; Sort the sensing score in set C.
The storage node then fetches the sensing records of query results and sends back them orderly associated with the computing commitment information.
After decrypting to get the OPS E(s u ), the user verifies the authenticity and completeness of the query result returned from the storage node through sample-based hypothesis testing method combined with computing commitment. The whole process is shown as follows.
-verify if |Q k | = k , Q k and key is sorted, Q k .OPS E(s k ) = key.C |key| and Σst = m, then f lag = 1. else f lag = 0. return.
-randomly sample n sensing records from the storage node. Then verify the sensing records through MACs. Finally, calculates the number h of sensor nodes whose sensing score is larger than OPS E(
With the perturbation ID list, the user computes the original sensing scores by subtracting s max from s u . Then sort the k original sensing score to get the top-k query result.
2) Analysis: We analyze the PriSecTopk III from three aspects.
Privacy: Similar to the PriSecTopk II, the data privacy, query privacy and result privacy are all well protected by the PriSecTopk III.
Efficiency: Except for the communication and computation overheads consumed in the PriSecTopk II, the strategy for authenticity/completeness verification introduces additional communication and computing consumption. As for the additional communication consumption, the storage node is asked to return computing commitment information along with the query result. Also, during the sampling verification process the user and storage nodes should communicate to exchange the verification information. The computing overhead of the verified step based on hypothesis testing method is O(N).
Authenticity/Completeness: Using the individual node key k u as the hash key of the MACs sent with the sensing records, the compromised storage nodes can not manipulate or append the sensing record because the node key of every sensor node is only known by the user and the sensor node respectively. Therefore, the authenticity of the query result the storage node sent back guarantees. Before proving the completeness of the scheme, we illustrate k − satis f action rate follows the normal distribution which is related with the computing commitment information, and prove the correctness of the hypothesis testing method to verify the completeness.
DEFINITION 1: k − satis f action rate is the rate of the number of sensor node whose sensing score larger than the k th highest sensing score in the query results among all the sensor nodes sampled THEOREM 2: k − satis f action rate follows the normal distribution N(E(p),
Proof: For k − satis f action rate p = m n , suppose that the sensing score of the sensor node i is larger than the k th highest sensing score in the query results, then x i = 1, else
For the moment generating f unction o f t
Hence, the moment generating function of t is similar to that of the normal distribution. Based on the uniqueness theorem of the moment generating function [15] , k − satis f action rate follows the normal distribution N(E(p),
Then the k th sensing score the storage node returned is indeed the k th largest sensing score among the time-slot data set. Proof: Use k − satis f action rate p to test the hypothesis H 0 : P = k /N. By T HEOREM2, k −satis f action rate follows the normal distribution N(E(p), p(1−p) n ) and the significance level of the test to calculate the k th largest sensing score α = 1 − t + 0.01, where t is the acceptance level to calculate the k th largest sensing score. Hence,
If the k th sensing score the storage node returned is indeed the k th largest sensing score among the time-slot data set, then the query result the storage node sent back is complete.
Proof: With the guarantee of the authenticity, if the query result the storage node sent back is not complete, the compromised storage node can only return a smaller sensing record to the user which offends the verification that the k th sensing score the storage node returned is indeed the k th largest sensing score as T HEOREM3.
VI. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we conduct a thorough experimental evaluation of the PriSecTopk scheme on a real-world dataset: Intel Berkeley Research Lab Data [10] which includes a log of about 2.3 million readings. We randomly select different data records to build the dataset. And the record schema we used is as follows.
Date: 8B Time: 8B MoteId: 4B Temperature: 4B The whole experiment system is implemented by C language on a Linux machine with Intel CPU running at 3.0GHz. Algorithms use MATLAB libraries. The performance of the PriSecTopk scheme is evaluated regarding the tradeoff between privacy and efficiency as well as the authenticity/completeness. Without loss of generality, suppose the size of MACs is 20B and the sampled times in the commitment information is 4B. In our experiment, we assume a cell with 400 sensor nodes and a storage node. the select times is 20, k = 30 and the random function follows the normal distribution. The scheme we proposed does not introduce additional innetwork communication consumption between sensor nodes and storage node which is far more efficient and practical than the secure approaches in [6] [7] [8] [9] . Therefore, we focus on the communication consumption between the storage node and the user as well as the computing consumption of the sensor nodes and the user.
A. Privacy
As shown in Section V-B2, the communication overheads between the storage node and the user in PriSecTopk II is determined by both of the security level and the k value in the top-k query. Figure. 1i gives the communication cost measurement to the fixed security level of our proposed. The result represents the mean of 50 trials. Note that even for a larger k value given a fix security level, the communication cost does not increase too much which is because the threshold of the random selection function adjusts adaptively. Specially, in the 80 bits security level, the communication cost between a storage node and the user of the proposed scheme is 1.7 × 10 3 B for top-10 query which is 1.8 × 10 3 B for top-20 query. However, from the Figure. 1ii , we can find a step change of the communication cost when the k value is large. The reason is that the main effect factor of communication factor changes from the threshold to the k value. Even though the step change, the additional communication consumption decreases, which indicates that the scheme we proposed is more efficient for the top-k query whose k value is larger.
B. Authenticity/Completeness
To guarantee the authenticity and completeness of the query result the storage node returns, we introduce the verification method based on hypothesis testing method with computing Figure. 2i and 2ii indicate the efficiency of our scheme with different k value and the number of sensor nodes. Compared to the VFTop-k proposed in [9] which brings large amount of communication consumption performed on time-slot dataset, namely, more than 10 4 B in our experiment environment, the scheme we proposed only introduces only 1 3 communication consumption than that of the VFTop-k as well as protecting the privacy which is not guaranteed in the VFTop-k. Figure.2i shows the impact of k on the communication cost which increases smoothly when k goes up, and the higher security level asks for more communication consumption. The similar result can be found in Figure. 2ii but the increment is smoother with the larger number of sensor nodes, which is because that with the number of sensor nodes rises up the length of the computing commitment information does not increase that much.
Considering the detection rate of the verification method we proposed, Figure. 2iii shows that the detection rate always larger than 90% in the experiment environment and the increment of the k value and the security level brings a slimly higher detection rate. Also, in the Figure. 2iv, we determine that the verification method adapts a large-scale sensor network with the reason that the larger number of sensor nodes increases the detection rate while it also bring larger communication consumption as shown above.
VII. Conclusion
We explore the problem of top-k query on time slot data set in two-tier wireless sensor network, and establish a set of privacy and correctness requirements for such a secure top-k scheme to become practical. We propose three PriSecTopk schemes meeting different privacy and correctness requirements in consideration of three levels of threat models. Thorough analysis investigating privacy, detection rate and efficiency guarantee of proposed scheme is given, and experiments on the real-world dataset further show the efficiency of proposed schemes.
